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In this paper we propose an index of the ﬁscal stance suitable for practical use in short-term policy
making. The index is based on a comparison of a target level of the debt-GDP ratio for a given ﬁnite
horizon with a forecast of the debt-GDP ratio based on a VAR formed from the government budget con-
straint. This approach to measuring the ﬁscal stance is diﬀerent from the literature on ﬁscal sustainability.
We emphasise the importance of having a forward-looking measure of the ﬁscal stance for the immediate
future rather than a test for ﬁscal sustainability that is backward-looking, or based just on past behaviour
which may not be closely related to the current ﬁscal position. We use our methodology to construct a
time series of the indices of the ﬁscal stances of the US, the UK and Germany over the last 25 or more
years. We ﬁnd that both the US and UK ﬁscal stances have deteriorated considerably since 2000 and
Germany’s has been steadily deteriorating since uniﬁcation in 1989, and worsened again on joining EMU.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent concerns in 2004 and 2005 about the ﬁscal stances of the US, France and Germany and of
possible reforms to the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (largely due to the errant ﬁscal positions
of France and Germany) have renewed interest in the issue of how to measure the ﬁscal stance.
In this paper we propose an index of the ﬁscal stance suitable for practical use in short-term
policy making. We take a very diﬀerent approach from the literature on ﬁscal sustainability even
though, like this literature, it is based on the government inter-temporal budegt constraint. We
emphasise the importance of having a forward-looking measure of the ﬁscal stance that focuses on
the implications of the current ﬁscal stance for the immediate future. We argue against focusing
on formal tests of the stationarity of debts and deﬁcits as they are backward-looking and not
necessarily a good guide to the current stance of ﬁscal policy.
The index is based on a comparison of a target level of the debt-GDP ratio for a given ﬁnite
h o r i z o nw i t haf o r e c a s to ft h ed e b t - G D Pr a t i ob a s e do naV A Rf o r m e df r o mt h eg o v e r n m e n t
budget constraint. By using a VAR forecasting model we avoid basing the index on a particular
theoretical model of the economy, and the index is simple to compute and readily automated.
We use our methodology to examine the ﬁscal stances of the US, the UK and Germany over
the last 25 or more years. We ﬁnd that both the US and UK ﬁscal stances have deteriorated
considerably since 2000 and Germany’s has been steadily deteriorating since uniﬁcation in 1989
and worsened again on joining EMU.
The emphasis on the ﬁscal stance, as opposed to ﬁscal sustainability, is a key feature of this
paper. Determining whether the current ﬁscal stance is sustainable has proved diﬃcult and con-
troversial, and has limited applicability in evaluating ﬁscal policy in the short run. Typically,
tests for ﬁscal sustainability focus on the dynamic properties of past debts and deﬁcits and as-
sume that these processes will continue into the inﬁnite future with a view to establishing whether
the present value of future primary surpluses are suﬃcient to meet current government debt oblig-
1ations. There are obvious problems with this approach. First, a failure to satisfy a test for ﬁscal
sustainability does not necessarily have any implications for the current ﬁscal stance. A govern-
ment could argue that ﬁscal sustainability can be achieved by changing future ﬁscal policy so that
suﬃcient surpluses would be generated. Or, it may be that rejection of ﬁscal sustainability was
due to past ﬁscal policy and that subsequent changes had removed the problem. In both cases,
the time series properties of past debts and deﬁcits would no longer be relevant for current policy.
Second, a failure to satisfy a test for ﬁscal sustainability has little immediate relevance if ﬁnancial
markets are still willing to hold government debt, perhaps in the belief that governments will make
the appropriate changes to ﬁscal policy in the future. Third, a test statistic is not a user-friendly
way of representing ﬁscal policy. Something more transparent is required such as an index se-
ries that can capture changes in the ﬁscal stance over time. Fourth, in the related literature on
inter-temporal current account sustainability, the outcome of the test for sustainability depends
on whether consumption is modelled correctly. We seek a measure of the ﬁscal stance based on
t h eg o v e r n m e n tc o n s t r a i n tt h a ti st h e o r yf r e e .
Although the outcome of tests for ﬁscal sustainability have not played much of a role in
discussions on ﬁscal policy, a measure of the current ﬁscal stance would still be helpful. Such
a measure should be easy to represent and compute and not depend on a particular theoretical
model of the economy. Governments need to know the likely consequences of their current ﬁscal
stance for their debt obligations and the costs of borrowing and of servicing the debt. Markets
need to know the risks associated with the ﬁscal stance in order to price government debt. The
Maastricht Treaty was an attempt to ensure that ﬁscal policy was set appropriately in the run-up
to EMU so that the temptation to inﬂate away debts was avoided. Its successor, the Stability
and Growth Pact, seeks to avoid ﬁscal spillovers from one country to another which might aﬀect
monetary policy or euro-debt obligations. It is increasingly recognised, however, that such ﬁscal
rules are neither necessary nor suﬃcient. Whatever the ﬁscal framework, a crucial ingredient is
an appropriate measure of the current ﬁscal stance.
2The index we propose is concerned with forecasting whether the debt-GDP ratio is likely to
exceed or fall below a pre-speciﬁed target over a pre-speciﬁed time horizon. Given the time horizon
and the target level of the debt-GDP ratio at the end of that horizon, the index is based on a
comparison of the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio and a forecast of the present value of the
current level of the debt-GDP ratio over the horizon derived from a simple VAR forecasting model
of the economy. If the index exceeds unity then the current ﬁscal stance is said to be inconsistent
with the debt objective over the horizon in the sense that debt is forecast to rise above target; if
the index is less than unity then the ﬁscal stance is said to be consistent with the debt objective.
The choice of a VAR model is to avoid taking a particular view of the economy and to permit
the method to be easily automated. The VAR is based on a log-linear approximation to the
government’s inter-temporal budget constraint in order that interest rates, inﬂation and growth
are allowed to be time varying. This approach is in contrast to much of the literature on ﬁscal
sustainability where interest rates, inﬂation and growth are held constant over the forecast horizon
in order to eliminate the non-linearities that their time variation would introduce into the inter-
temporal budget constraint.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we examine a number of diﬀerent ways of writing
the government budget constraint and establish our notation. In Section 3 we present an analysis
of ﬁscal sustainability with a view to showing its limitations in providing a useful measure of the
current ﬁscal stance. We provide an intuitive rationale for the various tests for ﬁscal sustainability
that have been proposed in the literature and discuss the technical problems in implementing
these tests. We then show how, by using a log-linear approximation to the government budget
constraint, ﬁscal sustainability can be tested in a way that permits the discount rate to be time-
varying and enables linear methods of analysis to be used once more. We also comment on the
implications of this analysis of ﬁscal sustainability for the debt and deﬁcit limits of the EU’s
Stability and Growth Pact. We derive our proposed ﬁs c a li n d e xi nS e c t i o n4a n ds h o wh o wi tc a n
implemented using VAR analysis. In Section 5 we calculate the index for the US, the UK and
3Germany over the period from the 1970’s to 2005. Our ﬁndings are summarized in Section 6.
2 The government budget constraint
We begin by considering the nominal government budget constraint (GBC), the sustainability of
ﬁscal policy and the implications of various ﬁscal rules, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth
Pact.1 The nominal GBC can be written
Ptgt +( 1+Rt)Bt−1 = Bt + ∆Mt + PtTt (1)
where gt is real government expenditure including real transfers to households, Tt is total real
taxes and Mt is the stock of outside nominal, non-interest bearing money in circulation that is
supplied by the government (the central bank) at the start of period t, Bt is the nominal value of
government bonds issued at the end of period t, Rt is the average interest rate on bonds issued
at the end of period t − 1 and RtBt−1 is total interest payments made in period t.2 Thus the
left-hand side of equation (1) is total nominal expenditures in period t and the right-hand side is
total revenues plus additions to government current ﬁnancial resources.
The equivalent real GBC can be derived from the nominal GBC by dividing through the

















1 There is a substantial literature on these issues. Most of it goes back some way in time. See, for example,
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Kremers (1989), Wilcox (1989), Blanchard, Chouraqui,
Hagemann and Sartor (1990), Bohn (1991, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2005), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Buiter, Corsetti and
Roubini (1993), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Wickens and Uctum (2000). There is also a related literature on
current account sustainability, see Sheﬀrin and Woo (1990) and Bergin and Sheﬀrin (2000) for a discussion of the
inter-temporal approach to the current account and Wickens and Uctum (1993) for analaysis of the sustainability
of a country’s net asset position.
2 In practice governments issue bonds at a discount and redeem them at par. Thus if all bonds were for one
period, then Bt = PB
t BG
t where BG










where πt = ∆Pt
Pt−1 is the rate of inﬂation, bt is the real stock of government debt, mt is the real stock




Thus, approximately, rt ' Rt − πt.
The GBC can also be expressed in terms of proportions of nominal or real GDP by dividing























where γt i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fG D Pa n dTt
yt is the average tax rate.
The total nominal government deﬁcit (or public sector borrowing requirement, PSBR) is de-
ﬁned as
PtDt = Ptgt + RtBt−1 − PtTt − ∆Mt
Hence Dt



























(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
bt−1
yt−1
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d es h o w st h en e tb o r r o w i n gr e q u i r e dt of u n dt h ed e ﬁcit expressed as a proportion
of GDP.
We also deﬁne the nominal primary deﬁcit Ptdt (the total deﬁcit less debt interest payments)
as









(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
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This is a non-linear diﬀerence equation in bt
yt.I fw ed e ﬁne
1+ρt =
1+Rt
(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
where approximately, ρt = Rt − πt − γt = rt − γt, is the real interest rate adjusted for economic










This is the key equation for determining the sustainability of ﬁscal policy. The stability of the
equation depends on the sign of ρt.
We note that the evolution of bt












For positive inﬂation and growth this is a stable diﬀerence equation
3 Fiscal sustainability
Fiscal sustainability concerns the evolution of bt
yt and whether it remains ﬁnite or explodes. In
this and subsequent sections we adopt the common terminology that the ﬁscal stance is said to
be sustainable if bt
yt is ﬁnite - and if ﬁnancial markets are willing to hold the level of debt that
emerges. Before describing our proposed new procedure for determining whether the ﬁscal stance
is consistent with given debt objectives, we review the principal methods in the literature for
testing what is referred to as ﬁscal sustainability. All take equation (5) as their starting point.
In discussing sustainability it is convenient to distinguish between two cases: where the discount
6rate ρt (and hence Rt,πt and γt) is assumed to be constant and where it is allowed to be time
varying.3
3.1 Constant discount rate
If ρt is assumed to be constant then, from equation (5), bt











where 1+ρ = 1+R
(1+π)(1+γ) or, approximately, ρ = R − π − γ.T h e s o l u t i o n f o r bt
yt depends on
whether the equation (7) is stable or unstable. We consider both cases.
Case1: ρ<0 (stable case)
In this case 1+R
(1+π)(1+γ) < 1 and equation (7) is a stable diﬀerence equation, and hence can
be solved backwards by successive substitution. The expected value of the debt-GDP ratio in n





















implying that the current level of debt has no bearing on debt in the inﬁnite future.














The evolution of the debt-GDP ratio depends on that of dt
yt. Suppose that dt
yt may be stochastic








3 Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bohn (1995, 2005) argue that the appropriate discount rate to use for discounting
future primary surpluses is the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution and not the real interest rate. In a



























if λ =0 (12)
If ρ,λ < 0 then limn→∞ Et(
bt+n
yt+n)=0 .I fλ>0 then it will explode. Thus, the debt-GDP ratio
will remain ﬁnite and positive if (−dt
yt), the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP, does not explode.
We note that if λ<0 then dt
yt is a stationary I(0) process and the expected, or long-run, value of
the debt-GDP ratio is zero. And if λ =0 ,t h e ndt
yt is a non-stationary I(1) process, and hence bt
yt
will also be I(1). Moreover, bt
yt and dt
yt will be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, 1
ρ).F i s c a l
policy is therefore sustainable provided bt
yt does not grow over time.
Case 2: ρ>0 (unstable case)
In this case 0 <
(1+π)(1+γ)
1+R < 1. Equation (7) is therefore an unstable diﬀerence equation and











































implying that the expected present value of current and future primary surpluses expressed as
a proportion of GDP (the right-hand side of equation (15)) must be suﬃcient to pay-oﬀ current
debt.
8Suppose once more that dt

















) if − 1 <λ<ρ , ρ>0
Thus, if −1 <λ<ρand ρ>0, the present value of primary surpluses will meet current debt
obligations. However, the debt-GDP ratio will grow at the rate λ,t h es a m er a t ea s−dt
yt .
If −1 <λ<0 then −dt
yt is stationary and bt
yt will also be stationary and ﬁnite. If λ =0 ,s o
that −dt











yt will be I(1) and will be cointegrated with −dt
yt with cointegrating vector (1,−1
ρ).
These results provide an insight into the rationale behind a number of well-known empirical
tests for ﬁscal sustainability. The test of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is based on the following
version of equation (13)
bt
yt









except that real debt and the real primary deﬁcit is used rather than bt
yt and dt
yt. The transversality
condition holds on the null hypothesis that .A0 =0 .
Trehan and Walsh (1988) propose a cointegration test for ﬁscal sustainability. They measure
debt and the primary deﬁcit in real terms rather than as proportions of GDP, but Hakkio and
Rush (1991) employ the test expressing the variables as proportions of GDP. We have already
seen from equations (12) and (17) that if the variables have unit roots and are cointegrated with
cointegrating vector (ρ,1) then ﬁscal policy is sustainable. (Or, if the primary deﬁcit is decomposed
into government expenditures and revenues and both are I(1), then the cointegrating vector with
debt must be (ρ,1,−1).)















It follows that bt
yt has a unit root if α = ρ.
3.2 Time-varying discount rate
In practice, ρt will be time-varying, not constant, and so these tests will in general be invalid. If
ρt < 0 then the budget constraint, equation (5), will be stable and the debt-GDP ratio will remain
ﬁnite if dt
yt is stationary.


























≤ 1 for all s≥ 1
























Like equation (15), equation (20) says that the present value of current and future primary sur-
pluses must be suﬃcient to oﬀset current debt liabilities. The diﬀerence is that the discount rate
is compounded from time-varying rates.







10We may now write equation (5) as
∆xt = zt









Wilcox (1989) shows that ﬁscal sustainability is satisﬁed if xt is a zero-mean stationary process.
Uctum and Wickens (2000) prove a more general result that does not require xt to be stationary.
They show that ﬁscal sustainability is satisﬁed if zt is a zero-mean stationary process when it
follows that xt will be an I(1) process.
3.3 Fiscal sustainability and the total deﬁcit
Another approach to ﬁscal sustainability is to focus on the relation between the debt and the total
deﬁcit, rather than the primary deﬁcit. This is given by equation (6) which is a stable diﬀerence
equation if πt+γt, the rate of growth of nominal GDP, is positive. If, in addition, Dt
yt is stationary
then bt
yt will be stationary and hence remain ﬁnite.
Trehan and Walsh (1991) therefore argue that ﬁscal policy is sustainable with a variable dis-
count rate if the total deﬁcit is stationary. We also note from previous results that the stationarity
of Dt
yt is a consequence of the cointegration of bt
yt and dt
yt,a n dvice-versa.
3.4 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The SGP was based on the original Maastricht conditions that bt
yt must be less than 0.6 and Dt
yt
must be less than 0.03. For given values of bt
yt and Dt
yt bounded above by bt
yt and D
y and for a




(1 + π)(1 + γ)








It follows that nominal growth must satisfy





Hence, given the limits on debt and deﬁcits speciﬁed under the SGP, the nominal rate of growth
must not be less than 0.03
0.6 ≡ 5%. If nominal growth were less than this then debt would rise above
60% even if the deﬁcit limit were satisﬁed. Although the debt-GDP ratio would exceed the SGP
limit, it would still satisfy the condition for ﬁscal sustainability.
Now suppose that the deﬁcit exceeds the 3% limit. Whether or not the debt-GDP ratio exceeds
60% depends on the rate of nominal growth. The higher the rate of nominal growth, the less likely
is the debt-GDP ratio to exceeds its limit. Once again, this does not aﬀect ﬁscal sustainability.
It follows that the SGP is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for ﬁscal sustainability in the long
run. This is because ﬁscal sustainability may be satisﬁed even if the SGP limits are breeched and
because it is also necessary that the rate of nominal growth is appropriate.
3.5 A log-linear approach to ﬁscal sustainability
To complete our discussion of ﬁscal sustainability, we propose an alternative way to deal with a
time-varying discount rate which we make use of later. This is to use a log-linear approximation
to the government budget constraint taken about the steady-state solution (assuming it exists).
As the primary deﬁcit can take negative values, it is necessary to write the GBC in terms of total
expenditures gt and total revenues vt both of which are strictly positive. We therefore re-write























(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
mt−1
yt−1
Next we approximate the GBC about the steady-state solution in which we assume that all
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Noting that a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation to h(xt)=e x p [ l nxt] about lnx is
h(xt) ' x[1 + (lnxt − lnx)]



































− (1 + ρ)ln(1+ρ)
As ln(1 + ρt) ' ρt,i ne ﬀect, the discount rate is an additional variable in the equation.
Using equation (21), ﬁscal sustainability may be analysed with a linear model even though the
discount rate is time-varying. The stability of the log-linearized GBC depends on the sign of ρ.











































If kt is stationary then ln bt
yt, and hence bt
yt, remains stationary and ﬁnite. This may occur
due to the individual terms of kt being stationary, or due to some terms being I(1) but being























4A n i n d e x o f t h e ﬁscal stance
4.1 An assessment of the tests for ﬁscal sustainability
All of these tests of ﬁscal sustainability, including the new log-linear test that we propose, are of
limited practicality. The main problem is that the tests are based on the past behaviour of debts
and deﬁcits whereas the sustainability of current ﬁscal stance is related to their future behaviour.
The test outcome could be dominated by an inﬂuential, but anomalous, period in the distant
past yet the current ﬁscal stance may still be sustainable. Even if the current ﬁscal stance is not
sustainable, governments could claim that a policy change planned for the future would make it
sustainable. As a result, the tests provide an ineﬀective constraint on ﬁscal policy, especially in
the near future.
This suggests that we need a more forward-looking approach that focuses on the short-term
implications of the current ﬁscal stance. As the ﬁscal position varies over time, it would be helpful
to have a measure that reﬂects this and enables historical comparisons to be made. We therefore
propose constructing an index number series of the current ﬁscal stance.
The index is based on the inter-temporal government budget constraint. The index measures
the ratio of the desired change in the discounted debt-GDP ratio over a given time horizon relative
to the forecast change. The target debt-GDP ratio at the end of the horizon could be, for example,
14a particular number such as the 60% SGP limit, a percentage reduction or the maintenance of the
current level of debt.
The forecast change in the debt-GDP ratio is, in eﬀect, the present value of current and future
primary surpluses. Future primary surpluses and discount rates are forecast using a VAR based
on the variables in the governmnent budget constraint. Any other forecasting model could be
used instead, including a structural model of the whole economy. The reasons for choosing a such
a VAR are its simplicity and its ease of replication and automation for any economy. We also
wish to try to avoid taking a particular view on macroeconomic theory and on the structural of
the economy. Since time variation in the future discount rate may be of importance, we base the
VAR on our log-linear approximation to the government budegt constraint.
The use of an index of sustainability was initially proposed by Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hage-
mann, and Sartor (1990) and Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993). Their indices are based on a
comparison of the current debt-GDP ratio and that n periods ahead with given ﬁxed values of
the deﬁcit and discount rate. By allowing the deﬁcit and discount rate to be time-varying and
endogenous, and the target level of the debt-GDP ratio to be a choice variable, we generalize these
indices.
4.2 Constructing the index
The basis of our proposed index is the inter-temporal log-linearized budget constraint equation













If we replace Et[ln
bt+n















The left-hand side of equation (26) can be interpreted as the desired change in discounted debt
between periods t and t + n. The right-hand side is the logarithmic equivalent of the present
15value of the primary surpluses required to achieve this desired change in discounted debt. We
replace Et(kt+s) by forecasts of the future values of kt based on the information available at time
t, including the current ﬁscal stance.
A measure of whether the current ﬁscal stance is likely to achieve the debt objective is obtained
by comparing the two sides of equation (26). If, for example, the aim is to decrease discounted
debt then the left-hand side will be negative and the right-hand side gives the present value of the
primary surplus required to achieve this reduction in debt. We therefore base our measure of the
consistency of the current ﬁscal stance with the n−period debt objective on the gap between the












−s Et(kt+s) R 0
Our index is









































− (1 + ρ)ln(1+ρ)
As n →∞the ﬁrst term in lnKt,n tends to zero and the index can be interpreted as comparing
the the existing level of the debt-GDP ratio with the resources to pay it oﬀ.
The index may be interpreted as follows:
(i) if FSI(t,n)=1the debt-GDP ratio in period t + n is forecast to be on target
(ii) if FSI(t,n) > 1 the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be below target
(iii) if FSI(t,n) < 1 the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be above target.
Only in case (iii) is the forecasted present value of the primary surplus insuﬃcient to achieve
the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio. In this sense the current ﬁscal stance would not be
16sustainable.
In practice, the special case considered by Buiter and Blanchard of maintaining a constant









−s Et(kt+s) R 0
The index then becomes

























































where the numerator of the index is now proportional to the present value of primary surpluses.
We consider this case in our empirical examples below.
4.3 Forecasting the ﬁscal variables












,ln(1 + ρt),ln(1 + γt),ln(1 + πt)
¶0
17For the reasons given above, we use of a VAR(p) to obtain these forecasts. This is a simple
forecasting scheme that is easily implemented and is theory free. We denote the VAR by
zt = A0 +
p X
i=1
Aizt−i + et, (29)
where et ∼ i.i.d.[0,Σ]. The vector of variables zt may be I(0) or I(1). For forecasting purposes it
is unnecessary to take account any non-stationarity or cointegration among the variables. Equally,
if cointegration exists, a cointegrated VAR could be estimated instead of a levels VAR and the
cointegrated VAR could then be written in levels to obtain equation (29). We also note that to
improve the forecasts, zt could contain additional variables to those that appear in the budget
constraint.
n−period ahead forecasts may be obtained using the companion form
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Deﬁning the selection matrix S =[I,0,0,..,0] such that
zt= SZt
and expressing kt as the following linear function of zt


















BiB0 + BsZt)]} − ln
bt
yt
As the last term ln bt
yt is another linear function of Zt, FS(t,n) c o u l da l s ob ew r i t t e na s
FS(t,n)=an + b0
nZt
where an is a scalar dependent on the time horizon and bn is a vector. This emphasises that
FS(t,n) is based on information available at time t and, in particular, the current ﬁscal stance.
Increasing the forecast horizon alters an and bn but not Zt.
To implement this in practice it will be necessary to derive an and bn from the VAR estimates.
T h ec h o i c eo fρ and c may be based, for example, on the average values in the sample, their average
values over the forecast period or their time t values. A time series for FS(t,n) may be calculated
from the sample either using all of the sample observations to estimate the VAR, or recursively
using only observations up to period t.
5I n d i c e s o f t h e ﬁscal stances of the US, the UK and Ger-
many
We now construct a time series of the index of the ﬁscal stance for the US, the UK and Germany.
For the US we consider three horizons: one-year, two-years and ﬁve-years ahead. For the UK and
Germany we use just a one-year horizon. We assume that the aim in each period is to maintain
the current level of the debt-GDP ratio. Hence, we use the version of the index given by equation
(28). The data are quarterly from 1960-2005 for the US and from 1970-2005 for the UK, but are
annual from 1977-2005 for Germany. The data sources and the construction of the variables are
described in the Appendix. There are minor diﬀerences in deﬁnitions for the diﬀerent countries.
For example, the debt data for the US are measured as net liabilities. This is diﬀerent from the
19Maastricht deﬁnition of debt but, given the deﬁnitions of the other variables, is consistent with
the government budget constraint.
In calculating the present values we require values for v
b,
g
b and ρ.W e e s t i m a t e b, g and ρ
using their sample averages. Table 1 gives the average values for Germany, the UK and the US.
Table 1
bgvρ
Germany 0.290 0.447 0.459 0.041
United Kingdom 0.352 0.405 0.435 0.086
United States 0.423 0.308 0.331 0.054
Note: b, g and ρ are sample averages, v is constructed from the steady-state equation v = g + ρb
5.1 The United states






yt ,R t,πt,γt,ρ t.T h eﬁrst four
variables are expressed as percentages of GDP and the last four are annualised percentages.







































Figure 1: US data
In Table 1 we report Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for these variables using up to 6 lags. We








y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
6 -1.280 -2.305 -2.127 -1.656 -1.984 -1.515 -5.347**
5 -1.734 -2.341 -2.089 -1.749 -2.031 -1.633 -5.415**
4 -2.156 -2.462 -2.076 -1.750 -1.927 -1.774 -5.947**
3 -1.197 -2.836 -2.062 -1.496 -1.704 -1.638 -5.481**
2 -0.7304 -2.511 -2.102 -1.324 -1.896 -2.082 -6.262**
1 -0.8553 -1.996 -1.952 -1.312 -2.375 -2.628 -6.882**
0 -0.4945 -1.824 -2.316 -1.270 -3.098* -3.825** -9.950**
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
As we are using the VAR only for forecasting we estimate a VAR in levels of the variables and
ignore any possible cointegration arising from the variables that have unit roots. For space reasons
we do not report the VAR estimates, but we note that a lag of 6 produces serially uncorrelated
residuals.
We examine ﬁscal sustainability based a constant target debt-GDP ratio for three horizons:
one-year, two-years and ﬁve-years ahead. For each horizon we present four ﬁgures. Figures 2.n
are plots of FSI(n), the index of the ﬁscal stance. We recall that FSI(n) < 1 implies that the
debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be above target. The forecasts are based on estimates of the VAR
for the whole sample.
Figures 3-5 give various breakdowns of the index into its component parts. Thus, Figures 3.n
are plots of lnbt
yt and the forecast logarithm of the present value of current and future primary
surpluses, lnKt,n, which we denote in the graph by EPVGBC(n). There are three components to
FS(t,n): the desired change in discounted debt PVdb(n), the present value of the primary surplus
21PVs(n) and the term for the discount factor, PVrho(n). These are plotted in Figures 4.n. An
indication of the beneﬁt of using a log-linear model is given by the extent to which PVrho(n)
diﬀers from unity. Finally, in Figures 5.n we plot the two components of PVs(n).T h e s ea r et h e
present value of revenues PVv(n) and of expenditures PVg(n).
(i) One-year horizon









Figure 2.1: US FSI(1).







b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 3.1: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].












Figure 4.1: US PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 5.1: US PVv(1) and PVg(1).
(ii) Two year horizon










Figure 2.2: US FSI(2).








60 b/y  EPVGBC(2) 
Figure 3.2: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(2)].












Figure 4.2: US PVs(2), PVdb(2) and PVrho(2).







PVv(2)  PVg(2) 
Figure 5.2: US PVv(2) and PVg(2).
(iii) Five-year horizon









Figure 2.5: US FSI(5).






70 b/y  EPVGBC(5) 
Figure 3.5: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(5)].












Figure 4.5: US PVs(5), PVdb(5) and PVrho(5).











PVv(5)  PVg(5) 
Figure 5.5: US PVv(5) and PVg(5).
We observe that FSI(n), the index of the ﬁscal stance, exceeds unity for any length of time
only during 1990’s. In the other periods it is either roughly equal to unity (implying that the
ﬁscal stance is compatible with a non-rising debt-GDP ratio) or less than unity (implying that the
debt-GDP ratio is rising). From 2001 the FSI strongly indicates a rising level of the debt-GDP
ratio at each horizon. The FSI is also less than unity for the period ending in 1989. The start
date of this period depends on the time horizon. For one-year and two-year horizons it is similar,
consisting of most of the 1980’s, but for the ﬁve-year horizon it extends back through the 1970’s,
27almost to 1965. Thus the 1990’s marked a period of US ﬁs c a lr e c o v e r yw h i c he n d e di na r o u n d
2000.
Decomposing the index into its components, we ﬁnd that FSI < 1 for the period 1979-1994
when the debt-GDP ratio rose substantially. We also ﬁnd that variations in the present value of
forecast primary surpluses are the main determinant of ﬂuctuations in the index. The change in
debt target and the discount factor nearly oﬀset each other. This is because we have assumed a
constant discounted debt target and so the discount factor is the variable causing the change in
discounted debt term to ﬂuctuate.
The present values for expenditures and revenues are similar before 1995 but are diﬀerent
thereafter. In the period 1995-2001 the present value of revenues exceed those of expenditures
thereby producing a ﬁscal recovery. After 2001 the present value of expenditures exceed those of
revenues. This ﬁscal deterioration was due to a combination of rising expenditures and sharply
falling revenues. Fluctuations in the discount rate make an additional, but not large, contribution.
To summarize, there is clear evidence of a break in US ﬁscal policy from 2001 that has resulted
in a rising debt-GDP ratio no matter the horizon over which we look. This ﬁscal stance would be
unsustainable if maintained. The cause is a combination of a rising present value of expenditures
and of sharply falling revenues. There have been previous periods when the ﬁscal stance also led
to a rising debt-GDP ratio, most notably from 1979-1994. This was not fully corrected until the
period 1995-2000 when the present value of expenditures was reduced and was much lower than
that of revenues.
5.2 The United Kingdom
The data for the UK are plotted in Figure 6.








































Figure 6: UK data
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are reported in Table 3. We conclude from these results that
ln
g
y and the real growth rate are stationary variables.
Table 3






y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
2 -2.349 -4.184** -2.416 -1.503 -1.267 -1.620 -3.600*
1 -2.432 -3.390* -3.194* -1.362 -1.768 -1.582 -4.595**
0 -1.400 -1.996 -2.250 -0.9936 -1.691 -1.757 -3.981**
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Based once again on a levels VAR(6), but considering only a one-year horizon, we obtain the
measures of the index reported in Figures 7-10.











Figure 7: UK FSI(1).









b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 8: UK b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].











Figure 9: UK PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 10: UK PVv(1) and PVg(1).
We observe only two brief periods where FSI >1. These are 1986-1988 and 1997-2000. From
1971-1984 and after 2000 FSI <1 often by a considerable margin. The period 1984-2005 has four
clear episodes. From 1984-1989 there were falls in the debt-GDP ratio and in both revenues and
expenditures in present value terms resulting in an improving ﬁscal position. This was a period
where privatization receipts were used to pay oﬀ debt, even though the assets were not included
in our measure of debt, namely, net government liabilities. From 1989-1992, when sterling left
the ERM, the ﬁscal position deteriorated sharply due to rising expenditures. This may even have
31been a contributory factor in the speculation against sterling in 1992. After 1992 the debt-GDP
rose steadily as it did in the US, but expenditures, after continuing to rise, turned down, which
caused an improvement in the ﬁscal stance. From 1996-2001 there was a marked improvement in
the ﬁscal position mainly due to rising revenues from the upturn in economic activity. From 2001
the ﬁscal stance deteriorated again due to expenditures (which started to increase in 1998) rising
much more than revenues. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has said throughout his tenure that
the UK is meeting its ﬁscal targets, but this evidence indicates that this has not precluded an
obvious decline in the sustainability of the UK’s ﬁscal stance.
5.3 Germany









































Figure 11: Germany data
The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Table 4 do not allow us to reject a unit root
for any of the variables
Table 4






y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
2 -1.315 -2.102 -1.653 -2.016 -1.355 -2.176 -2.515
1 -1.918 -2.080 -1.382 -1.645 -1.635 -2.850 -3.472*
0 -3.582* -2.017 -1.422 -5.303** -2.125 -3.431* -3.680*
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
T h er e s u l t so nt h ei n d e xo ft h eﬁscal stance for the period from 1977 are reported in Figures
11-15 for a one-year horizon. The reason for starting in 1977 is that prior to this the debt-GDP
ratio was negative.







Figure 12: Germany FSI (1).







b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 13: Germany b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].













Figure 14: Germany PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 15: Germany PVv(1) and PVg(1).
There has been a steady deterioration in the FSI over the whole period since 1977. There
were two occasions when the index worsened sharply. They are in 1989 on German uniﬁcation,
and again in 1999 shortly after EMU began. Both events seem to have been very harmful to
the ﬁscal stance. Throughout the period the debt-GDP ratio has risen and, with the exception
of the period 1992-1999, the ﬁscal position has gradually deteriorated. The improvement during
the period 1992-1999 coincides with improvements in the US and UK and is due to sustained
economic growth causing a rise in tax revenues. But since expenditures also increased during this
period, the improvement in the German ﬁscal stance was less marked that for those of the US
and UK. Since 1999 the ﬁscal stance has continued to worsen as expenditures, although falling
over the period, have exceeded revenues which have also decreased. The observed secular decline
in the German ﬁscal stance reﬂects and supports the widespread perception that Germany may
need structural reform.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have proposed the construction of an index to measure the current ﬁscal stance.
We have distinguished this from existing measures of the sustainability of the ﬁscal stance and
35argued that such tests, which focus on the past, may not be a helpful guide to the current stance
of ﬁscal policy. Like the tests for ﬁscal sustainability, this index is based on the government
inter-temporal budget constraint. The main diﬀerences are that the index is forward looking, it
applies to a ﬁnite time horizon, and it uses a log-linear approximation to the government budget
constraint which enables the inﬂation, economic growth and interest rates to be time varying
rather than constant. In eﬀect, the index is based on a comparison of the forecast and the desired
debt-GDP ratio over that horizon where the forecast is constrained to satisfy the government
budget constraint. We propose the use of a VAR forecasting model based on the government
budget constraint as this is simple to compute and easily automated. We have shown how to
identify individual components of the index that may be causing problems for the ﬁscal stance.
We have applied this methodology to three countries: the US, the UK and Germany. In the
U Ka n dU St h ei n d e xo fﬁscal sustainability has ﬂuctuated considerably with periods when the
debt-GDP ratio has risen followed by periods when it has fallen. During the period of strong
economic growth in the 1990’s the ﬁscal positions of all three countries improved considerably,
but in recent years the ﬁscal stance in all three countries has been steadily deteriorating. Our
index indicates that a continuation of the present ﬁscal stances is leading to ﬁscal unsustainability
in the three countries. We have shown that the German ﬁscal position has worsened steadily over
the last thirty years with only a brief respite in the mid 1990’s. A sharp deterioration occurred
after uniﬁcation and again on joining EMU.
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38Data appendix
The US data are quarterly for the period 1960.1 to 2005.4 and are taken from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook database and are described in the OECD Economic Outlook Database Inventory
and on the Annex Tables session of the Sources and Methods.
GDP, Value, at market prices, of gross domestic product;
GNFL, Value of government net ﬁnancial liabilities4 ;
PGDP,d e ﬂator of GDP at market prices;
GGINTP, Value of gross government interest payments;
GGINTR, Value of gross government interest receipts;
GNINTP, Value of net government interest payments5 ;
YPG T, Value of government total disbursement;
YR G T, Value of government total receipts;
IRS, Short-term nominal interest rate (in percentages)6 ;
IRL, Long-term interest rate (in percentages)7 .
The variables used in this study are then calculated as follows:
1. bt
yt is GNFL deﬂated by GDP.
2. vt
yt is YR G T minus GGINTR and deﬂated by GDP.
3.
gt
yt is YPG T minus GGINTP deﬂated by GDP.
4. Rt is GNINTP deﬂated by the GNFL in the previous period value
5. πt is the quarterly rate of change in the natural logarithm of PGDP.
4 This variable refers to the consolidated gross ﬁnancial liabilities of the government sector net of short-term
ﬁnancial assets, such as cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector etc.
5 GGINTP = GNINTP − GNINTR
6 U.S. rates refer to interest rates on United States dollar three-month deposits in London, UK interest rates
are 3-month rates on interbank loans, while Germany interest rates refer to the 3-month FIBOR rate.
7 Rates refer to the ten-year government bond yield for the US and the UK, while they refer to the federal bond
y i e l di nt h ec a s eo fG e r m a n y .
396. rst is IRS divided by 100
7. rll is IRL divided by 100
40